The 
Introduction: Varieties of temporary staffing in the protected employment economies
Germany, Japan and the Netherlands are countries with very strong protections of permanent workers in the form of legislated regulations or judicial precedence. On the OECD scales covering employment protection, these three countries are among the strictest in terms of limiting individual dismissals (OECD 2004, pp. 72) . In the Varieties of Capitalism literature, the "preference" for permanent employment in coordinated capitalist countries (like Germany and Japan) is attributed to firms' strong investments in skill formation and workers' interests in counteracting the negative effects of having acquired firm-specific skills during economic downturns (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Iversen 2005) . As the argument goes, workers and their representatives have demanded protections in coordinated capitalist countries because firm-specific skills are not transportable to other firms in the case of dismissals. A shared interest by labor and capital in protecting skill assets lays the basis for societal preferences for long-term employment commitments. In contrast to liberal capitalist countries, the market for temporary staffing in coordinated capitalist countries was (until recently) restricted by labor laws in line with societal preferences for long-term employment, suggesting that varieties of capitalism are also varieties of temporary staffing.
Yet temporary staffing is not a new industry in the protected employment economies of coordinated capitalism. In Germany, Japan and the Netherlands a hybrid form of agency work had emerged by the early 1990s combining elements of regular employment contracts with limited durations of placement in client firms, constituting an alternative model of "employment type" temporary staffing. At the core of this alternative is the establishment of a "regular," though often, limited-term, employment contract with a temporary staffing agency. The first part of this paper highlights the role of government and the social partners in negotiating the legalisation of the industry up through the 1980s in these three countries. In the context of rising and high unemployment in the 1990s, governments and the social partners grew more interested in an expanded staffing industry as a way to activate labor markets. As liberalisation pressures grew however, departures from the "employment form" of temporary staffing and differences among the coordinated capitalist economies in the social protection of temporary staff became more evident. These regulatory changes and the differences between the staffing industry in Germany, Japan and the Netherlands are the subject of the second part of the paper. The paper concludes with an assessment of the continuing attempts to establish a form of temporary staffing with employment, wage and social protections.
Initial Union and Regulatory Responses to Temporary Staffing in the Protected Employment Economies
The temporary staffing industry in Germany, Japan and the Netherlands dates back to the 1960s -the same time as the industry took hold in the US. Today, Dutchowned companies are among the most important world players in the staffing industry (Coe et al. 2004) while Japanese staffing firms are expanding into Asian labour markets. The first temporary staffing firms in Germany and Japan were foreign investors entering these markets from abroad; yet in contrast to the US, where the staffing industry strongly lobbied for legalisation and legitimating (Gonos 1997) , staffing operations in the protected employment economies settled into niches and stayed there for nearly 20 years, tolerated by both the social partners and government bodies in the protected economies, often despite dissonance with legislative restrictions.
In the Netherlands the temporary staffing industry was faced with early regulation, in response to the continuing operation of private staffing agencies despite the intended monopoly of public labor exchanges in placement services. The provisions of the Temporary Employment Act of 1965 required licensing, the prohibition of the industry in specific industries (e.g. shipping, construction) the application of maximum durations for temporary placements and the prohibition of the use of temps to replace striking workers (Sol 2005) . The early Dutch law prefaced the types of regulations which governments in Japan and Germany would legislate some twenty years later and established a style of regulation shared by the protected employment economies, based on the recognition of temporary staffing as an employment relation between a temporary agency and the temporary worker. In the early Dutch law, this recognition was based on the extension of unemployment protections, sickness and disability provisions enjoyed by regular employees (under Dutch labor laws) to the temporary agency workforce (Sol 2005; Koene, et al. 2003) .
The entry in 1962 of the US-based Manpower agency into Japan, and in the same year, of Swiss-based ADIA into Germany were partly intended and perceived as challenges to the legislative and cultural barriers facing the staffing industry in these two strong industrial economies (see below). In neither case however, did a serious challenge to employment protections through the substitution of permanent with temporary labor arise. Governments maintained their prohibitions against agency employment, labor unions tended to ignore temporary agency employees and the few agencies in these countries continued to take root and expand their services with little disruption by finding niches on the labor market peripheries of the protected employment economies.
These labor market peripheries were composed of either female or low-skilled workers. Manpower in Japan, for example, focussed its business explicitly on the placement of female clerical workers, who in cultural terms, were considered to be temporary labor market participants anyway. Rather than challenging commitments to permanent employment, the industry actually aligned itself well with gendered Japanese employment practices distinguishing between long-term employed male breadwinners, and young female clerical workers who were expected to resign upon marriage. The dispatching of male staff fell initially outside the purview of the staffing industry, but was practiced strongly in manufacturing in the contexts of inter-firm supply chains. Temporary staffing in Germany began with the placement of female clerical workers, but soon moved into the placement of low-skilled male and female employees in manufacturing industries. Temporary staffing in Germany mainly served the function of providing replacements for employees on leave, in the context of this country's generous sickness, maternity and vacation leave provisions. In contrast to most other countries, temporary staff in Germany is primarily men dispatched to manufacturing industries. In the Netherlands, the public employment exchanged focussed on the placement of workers into full-time regular jobs, leaving temporary placements to the private agencies (Koene, Paauwe & Groenewegen 2004) . Further, the constitution of temporary agency staffing as a normal employment contract with unemployment and social benefits lent the industry more legitimacy earlier on in the Netherlands (see Storrie 2002; Koene, Paauwe & Groenewegen 2004) , than was the case in either Germany or Japan, where the industry remained formally illegal until the 1980s. 1 A grey zone of labor supply contracting emerged in post-war Japan, whereby some suppliers were relied upon to supply labor rather than goods for production. The first forays into legalising the temporary staffing industry were motivated by government efforts to regulate the private labor supply practices (Imai 2004 R 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Year
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Note: the size of the industry is of course limited by the size of the country. The Dutch temporary staffing industry is an important global player, despite the relatively small number of enterprises in Holland.
The temporary staffing of clerical workers in Japan operated in much the same way as in the US -temporary staff being dispatched as needed, and thus left without employment between assignments. This "classic" practice contrasted with the subcontracting of personnel within supply chains, who retained regular employment contracts with their original firms before, during and after the period of dispatch. This latter form of temporary staffing, covering primarily male employees, involved a level of employment and social security not accessible to the dispatched staff of the "classic" temporary staffing agencies. 6 The legalisation of temporary staffing through the first law covering the employment form in 1986 retained this key difference in forms of staffing, with important consequences for the segmentation of the staffing labor force: the largest segment was the female dominated "classic" temporary worker (touroku gata or "registered type", about 80% of all temps in the late 1980s) and a domain of primarily male workers with regular employment contracts, dispatched to client companies (jouyou gata or "employment type"). The 1986 temporary staffing law in Japan limited the industry to a short list of 13 occupations, extended to 16 in a 1990 revision, 26 in 1996 and eventually abandoned in the ensuing wave of deregulation from 1999 onwards.
The initial wave of legalisation and regulation of the staffing industry in the Netherlands, Germany and Japan extended many aspects of "normal" employment relations to temporary staff. This happened early on in the Netherlands, but most clearly in Germany. Thus, the synchronization of temporary assignments and employment by an agency was prohibited in German regulations, but not in the Netherlands (Wilkens 2005) . The Japanese "employment type" of staffing arose alongside a "registered type" segmented along sectoral, occupational and gender divisions. The "employment type" was not based on a "synchronization prohibition" as in Germany, but in the fact that the regular staffs of supplier companies was dispatched to client firms -in extreme cases suppliers only supplied staff. In both the Netherlands and Germany, the "employer type" evolved out of a situation of union opposition and public commitments to the monopoly of public labor exchanges.
Added to this in the Netherlands was the engagement of unions early on in balancing the interests of regular and contingent workers. German unions failed to do so. A similar emphasis on "employment" and "employment-like" forms of temporary staffing, as well as the different origins and regulatory legacies in these countries set the stage for how well these alternatives to the US-style of "registered" temp staffing survived the next wave of regulatory changes.
Regulatory and Deregulatory Efforts in the late 1990s
The legal constitution of temporary staffing as a regular employment contract between agencies and workers extended many of the social protections enjoyed by regular employees in the protected employment economies to temp staff, insuring against the substitution of regular with temporary employees. Limitations on the licensing of staffing firms also helped to preserve the monopoly of public labor exchanges in Germany and the Netherlands, while in Japan, the prerogative of firm groups to exchange labor internally and informally was acknowledged. Crises in the public labor exchanges in the Netherlands and Germany, and redundancies and downsizing in the Japanese private sector exposed the limits to these established functional alternatives and predecessors to the contemporary staffing industry in the face of fundamental economic restructuring and rising unemployment. The regulatory tenor of temporary staffing shifted during the 1990s in all three countries as public actors turned to staffing as a solution to high rates of unemployment, labor shortages in new industries and in Germany and the Netherlands, as a solution to the ineffectiveness of public labor exchanges in placing long-term unemployed.
In all three countries, the de-regulation of temporary work was a matter of political negotiation, but negotiations did not include unions to the same degree.
Cross-national differences in the "infrastructure" of social partnership, the role of this These differences in state action and labor participation continue to shape the dynamics and outcomes of the regulation of the staffing industry in the protected economies. There is a shift away from the "employment type" of temporary staffing in Japan and Germany, but in some important respects, this alternative to "registered" temping has been strengthened in the Netherlands. These differences, among others, also shape the effectiveness of collectively bargaining for temporary workers, which has entered the stage as a regulatory option in the Netherlands and Germany.
Where the social partners have been most thoroughly excluded from employment policy negotiations -Japan -advances in protections for temporary workers in the context of industry deregulation are the weakest.
The severity of labor market performance was first evident in the Netherlands, which suffered a more severe recession the early 80s than in other OECD countries in the wake of the second oil shock (Hemerijck & Vail 2006) . Germany and Japan seemed to recover well until the early 1990s, when Japan was launched into a long and deep recession after the Asian financial crisis and Germany was faced with the economic absorption of the new federal states under the unification policy following the fall of the Berlin wall. While the public discourse around temporary staffing in many of the liberal market economies (e.g. the UK and the US) has been centered around demands and discussions about numerical flexibility, in the protected employment economies rising unemployment (in the Netherlands, low employment rates) played a far more important role in pressures for deregulation. The utility of temporary staffing was viewed less in the replacement of "regular" with temporary staff, and more in creating transitional employment for workers dislocated by together with an infrastructure for economic forecasting, constitute the infrastructure for social negotiations in the Netherlands (Hemerijck and Vail 2006) . 8 Both the Dutch success in revigorating social negotiations and the Japanese failure occurred in the midst of the most serious recessions and under center-right governments.
industrial restructuring. This difference also identified a specific "performance goal"
(and social contribution) for the staffing industry -moving workers, through temporary assignments, back into permanent or regular employment.
An important symbolic resource for dismantling the traditional opposition of labor to the deregulation of staffing was the replacement of ILO convention 96
prohibiting private labor exchanges with convention 181 (in 1997) on private employment agencies. This new convention recommended national level regulation of the industry, and thus opened gates for the re-deliberation of existing restrictions among the social partners and in the employment policy formation process.
Convention 181 also included a list of recommendations for the social sustainability of temporary staffing, and developments in EU policy-making began to formulate directives for the equal treatment of temporary staff. These formulations served as guidelines for labor from the late 1990s onwards, in developing positions and demands in regulatory discussions and processes, helping to compensate for the general lack of attention of labor, especially in Germany and Japan, to the situation of contingent workers.
With both the willingness and resources for neo-corporatist negotiation of employment policy, and an early commitment to improving the situation of contingent workers, the Dutch social partners signed a new agreement in December 1993, setting, as the agreement was called, a "new course" of "balance between flexibility and security by reducing levels of protection of existing ("core") workers, coupled with enhanced employment opportunities and social security for atypical workers." (Hemerijck & Vail 2006) . Dutch legislative initiatives were developed to counter the
inflexibility of the open-ended employment contract which made it extremely difficult for employers to dismiss full-time employees (Storrie, 2002; Bas et al., 2004) . Exactly this coupling of a reduction of protections for the regularly employed with an improvement of protections for atypical workers is the unique feature of the so-called "Dutch model".
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For the first time in 1995 a collective bargaining agreement between unions and associations of temporary staffing firms concluded an agreement regulating employment security and pension coverage after two years of affiliation with a temporary agency (Visser & Hemerijck 1997 have an incentive to make sure protections remain intact. These legal and bargained provisions fall short of comprehensive equal treatment and employment protection, and thus tend to benefit those employees with the best chances of finding permanent employment anyway. While the number of temporary staff firms has expanded under these provisions, this expansion is generally attributed to the lifting of many licensing requirements rather than the expansion of temporary employment, which has hovered under about 3% of the dependently employment over the past years.
In Japan, the occupational restrictions placed on temporary staffing in the first 1986 regulation of the industry were aimed at a selective expansion of the market for temporary staff in sectors plagued by shortages of high-skilled workers (e.g. software specialists) and/or where work organizational factors (e.g. project-based work)
demanded temporary work assignments. The exception to these criteria within the list of occupations was clerical work where neither shortages nor temporary work organisations mandated demands for temporary contracts. The inclusion of clerical work in the temporary staffing occupations signalled instead a willingness on the part of the government and social partners to permit firms to reduce their commitments to female workers in the face of white-collar rationalisation. On the basis of this law, many major corporations established their own staffing subsidiaries, and began sourcing all new female clerical staff from these subsidiaries 11 .
The deregulation of the temporary staffing industry became an aim of policy makers in the context of an economy-wide deregulatory drive from 1995 onwards.
The lifting of the ILO convention prohibiting private labor exchanges in 1997 was The heterogeneity of the temporary staffing workforce in Japan, together with the absence of any attempt to institutionalize equal treatment, is especially evident in wage forms and ranges among Japanese temp staffing. "Employment type" staff are more likely to receive monthly wage payments (about 60% of all staff in this category)
while "registered type" receive hourly payments (82.9%). Wages for temporary staff are market-driven, and range from an average hourly rate of ¥2069.30 for software development temps to half that rate for temps in sales (¥1050). 13 Female temps earn on average 65.6% of male temp wages. Average wages of "employment type" and "registered type" temps are about the same, but benefits and social insurance cover differs a great deal: "employment type" temps are more likely to receive commuting allowance and annual bonus payments received by regular workers and are more comprehensively covered by both employment and health insurance (Imai 2004 , pp. On the heels of the Job-AQTIV law, the failure of the social democratic government to reduce unemployment levels, the uncovering of a scandal at the public labor exchange regarding over-reported placements of unemployed workers and the fact that 2002 was a federal election year all spurred the social democratic government to intervene again, but this time not by calling the social partners together, nor by initiating reforms on their behalf. Instead, the Schroeder government formed an independent commission of industry experts, most of them from large export-oriented German firms and international consultancies specialized in change management, with the explicit aim of overhauling the organization of the public employment exchange. Of the 15 government appointed members of this independent commission, lead by the VW manager Peter Hartz, only two were union officials and one an official of an employers' association (Vitols 2007, pp. 176 -178) .
The Hartz commission recommended lifting nearly all restrictions on the temporary staffing industry, while creating a sector of public staffing services to place long-term unemployed. State-paid wage subsidies were recommended to create an incentive for private sector firms to take on long-term unemployed on a temporary basis. Given the obvious competitive disadvantages for the private sector temporary staffing industry of a public sector staffing service at low wage rates, unions were forced to abandon efforts to make equal treatment part of the Hartz recommendations. Union agreement to collective bargaining on the other hand, was wrought through a political exchange within the commission, as the price for guarantees that unemployment benefits would not be cut for older unemployed workers (Vitols 2007, pp. 180 -183) .
In employers' associations, who wanted to avoid equal treatment (Vitols 2007, pp. 185 -187 2007 pp. 188 -194) . By way of comparison, a recent study defines wages below 9.96€ on average as the low wage threshold (Bosch & Kalina 2007, pp. 31 ). This relative disorganisation of both the union and employers' associations in the temporary help industry in Germany draws yet another contrast to the Dutch case, where central agreements and extension clauses have created nation-wide wage grades and relatively uniform conditions for temporary staff. Collective bargaining in the temporary staff industry is now considered by unions in Germany to have failed, with renewed calls for state intervention, at the very least for setting minimum wage levels to raise the floor on staffing industry agreements.
(very tentative) Conclusion
In what sense has the analyses of temporary staffing in this paper demonstrated a "variety of temporary staffing" characteristic of the protected employment economies of coordinated capitalisms? In Germany, the Netherlands and Japan the expansion of the temporary staffing industry was a "negotiated expansion" well into the 1980s. An important similarity across these three protected employment economies was the attempt to institutionalize temporary staffing as an employment relation between agencies/dispatching firms and temporary workers.
This was accomplished informally in Japan, along the lines of inter-firm supplier networks. The employment status of temporary staff and restrictions on the staffing industry to institutionalize employment protections were strongest in Germany. The role of unions in these Germany and Japan however, was more oriented toward preventing the substitution of regular with temporary staff, and less concerned with the actual employment conditions of contingent workers. Only in the Netherlands did unions take up the cause of improving conditions for temporary workers in the 1980s.
The "employment variety" of temporary staffing has diverged in the course of the 1990s. We have argued that differences in the infrastructure for social bargaining and the inclusion of labor in major re-regulations of temporary work shaped the extent to which the "employment variety" could be secured through either the institutionalization of equal treatment or collective bargaining. The nearly complete exclusion of labor in Japan and growing segmentation within the booming sector of staffing employment as well as between "permanent temporary" and regular employment have transformed temporary staffing into an extremely heterogeneous and relatively unprotected form of employment. The marginalization of labor in the reregulation of temporary staffing in Germany and a bizarre sequence of political bargains by the ruling social democratic coalition have rendered equal treatment inaccessible and collective bargaining ineffective. The consequence is the unintended rise of low-wage temp staffing. Under far more favourable circumstances, trading off equal treatment for collective bargaining in the Netherlands has opened up the possibility for strengthening the "employment type" of temporary staffing through the phase system. The experience with the phase system is still young, the opportunities plentiful for temporary staffing agencies to evade the movement of workers into higher phases, so that the actual success of this model is not yet clear.
As the first decade of twenty-first century comes to a close, divergence rather than convergence characterizes the comparison of employment status, working conditions and social protections for temporary staff within the most protected employment economies of coordinated capitalism.
